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Chapter 6 
From “Patriotism” to Mass Murder: Dr Mehmed Reşid (1873-1919) 
Hans-Lukas Kieser 
 
Dr Mehmed Reﬂid had been among the founders of the ‹ttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti 
(Committee Union and Progress, CUP).1 But unlike co-founder Dr Abdullah Cevdet, or other 
émigrés from Russia, Dr Ali Hüseyinzade and Yusuf Akçura, he did not excel intellectually. 
Neither was he a member of the hard core of the CUP that had been forming since 1906. Rather 
idealistic, and fancying himself to be incorruptible, he lacked the pragmatic sense of power of 
colleagues such as Dr. Nâzım  and Bahaeddin ﬁakir, or of his future boss, Minister of the Interior 
Tâlât  Bey. All the more, he can be seen as a typical representative of the ‹ttihadist generation 
with a middle-class background and Western style education, while at the same time, a 
distrustful, proud and radical nationalist. How could a well educated, upright patriot become then 
a mass murderer? 
Born in the Russian-administered Caucasus in 1873, Mehmed Reﬂid Shahingiray moved 
with his family to Istanbul in 1874. He became an Ottoman subject, grew up in the Ottoman 
capital and studied at the Military Medical School. After the Young Turkish Revolution of 1908, 
he decided to change over from medicine to the civil administration and became a governor of 
the district and finally, in 1915, governor (vali) of the province of Diyarbakır. It was a small elite, 
made up of a few dozen people, which, led by a handful of figureheads, profoundly affected the 
fate of Turkey between 1908 and 1938. Dr Reﬂid was particularly implicated in the expulsion of 
                                                
1 A much earlier and longer version of this chapter had been published under the title “Dr. 
Mehmed Reﬂid (1873–1919: A political doctor” in Hans L. Kieser and Dominik J. Schaller 
(eds.), Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah/ The Armenian Genocide and the 
Shoah (Zürich:  Chronos, 2002), pp. 245–280.  For more on Reﬂid's governorship, see Üngör, 
Ü. U€ur, “Center and Periphery in the Armenian Genocide: The Case of Diyarbekir Province,” 
in Kieser, Hans-Lukas, and Plozza, Elmar (eds.), Der Genozid an den Armeniern, die Türkei 
und Europa/ The Armenian Genocide, Turkey and Europa (Zürich: Chronos, 2006), pp. 71-88; 
and David Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern 
Anatolia during World War I (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2006). 
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Greek Christians and the extermination of Armenians and Assyrians (Syriac Christians) in 1914–
1916. The officious Türk Ansiklopedisi (Turkish Encyclopaedia) in its volume 32, published in 
1978, presents him as a perfect patriot. Mithat Shükrü, CUP Secretary General during World War 
I, says that many members of the party thoroughly shared the opinions of the vali of Diyarbakır, 
but that after the cease-fire of 1918 they changed their language.2 
Dr Reﬂid is a terrifying figure, but there is also something tragic about him. A victim of 
the dynamics, fears and ideals that he shared with the members of his party, he, unlike many 
others, did not have the time to rewrite his past. The writings he left behind therefore retain, in all 
their subjectivity, a rare authenticity.3 Indeed he met an untypical end. Unlike the vast majority of 
‹ttihadists (CUP members), he was unable to manage his personal transition from the war regime 
under Tâlât and Enver to the national movement under Mustafa Kemal. Neither did he manage to 
                                                
2 Güngör, Salâhattin, “Bir Canlı Tarih Konuﬂuyor”, Resimli Tarih, 5 July 1953, 2445. 
3 I am using the edition by Nejdet Bilgi: Mehmed Reﬂid [ﬁahingiray], Hayatı ve Hâtıraları, ed. 
by N. Bilgi (Izmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1997).  I will refer to it as “Bilgi 1997”, but will cite 
the texts of Mehmed Reﬂid by their titles, e.g. “Reﬂid, Balıkesir Notları,” giving the page 
numbers according to Bilgi’s edition, which comprises the following texts of Reﬂid: 1) 
Taﬂkıﬂla Hatıraları,  57–64; 2) Balıkesir Notları,  65–76; 3) Mülâhazât: Ermeni Meselesi ve 
Diyarbekir Hatıraları,  77–114; 4) Günlük: Tevkiften ‹ntihara kadar, 115–154; 5) Vasiyetnâme,  
157–58; 6) Hal Tercümesi: Kendi El Yazısı ‹le Biyografisi, 163–65; 7) Arzı: 1911 Yılına Ait 
Bir Arzı, pp. 173–177. 
The edition Dr. Reﬂid Bey’in Hatıraları: ‘Sürgünden ‹ntihara’, by A. Mehmetefendio€lu 
(Istanbul: Arba, 1993), contrary to Bilgi’s edition, only gives the censured version of 
Mülâhazât and Günlük as they were published in 1919 in the newspapers Alemdar and 
Memleket. 
In addition, I will use the following text: Cevrî (Mehmed Reﬂid Bey), ‹nkılâb Niçin ve Nasıl 
Oldu (Mısır: Matbaa-i ‹ctihad, 1909).  There is a new edition also by Bilgi (Izmir: Akademi 
Kitabevi, 1994).  I will cite it as Cevrî, ‹nkılâb.  Most probably Cevrî is a pseudonyme for 
Mehmed Reﬂid [see N. Bilgi's arguments in the introduction: Cevrî, ‹nkılâb, 11–23], even if 
before 1908 Mehmed Reﬂid had used the CUP nickname “Çerkes Lâmi” od “Lâli” [see ﬁükrü 
Hanio€lu, The Young Turks in Opposition (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 
286–289, n. 410, n. 478, n. 487, and p. 356, n. 86] 
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flee abroad, as did the great party leaders. A few days after the armistice he was arrested by the 
Ottoman authorities, who accused him of being responsible for the massacre of the Armenians 
and the murder of two kaymakams who, in 1915, had opposed his anti-Christian policies in the 
province of Diyarbakır. He realized that he would be executed and therefore took his own life in 
February 1919, after having previously made an attempt to escape.  
Mehmed Reﬂid Shahingiray is part of what can be called the first Young Turkish cohort. 
Like the second Young Turkish cohort, it came primarily from the middle class and from outside 
the capital where it generally studied at the state élite schools. Contrary to the second cohort, its 
seminal intellectual experience was not the Turkist awakening – the ethno-nationalist self-
articulation as members of a “Turkish nation” in the 1910s. Its first concern was how to save the 
Ottoman Empire, considered as the last defense of the Islamic world, against imperialist 
European powers. This was particularly true for the “Turks” (term used as synonym for the 
Muslims) from Russia who lived as émigrés in Istanbul, the seat of the Sultanate and Caliphate. 
Mehmed Reﬂid was part of a social stratum of often bourgeois Russian Muslim immigrants who 
decisively influenced the Turkish national movement from the end of the nineteenth century. It is 
within the circles of Turkish speaking Muslims from Russia that from the outset Islam was 
integrated into Turkish nationalism, and Turkism was born. This prepared the move to the 
general ethno-national “awakening” among educated Turks in the 1910s within the broad 
movement of the Foyers turcs (Türk yurdu and Türk oca€ı).4 It is worth noting that the 
atmosphere in late tsarist Russia's urban centers and particularly among its diasporas in Western 
Europe and Istanbul led to the creation of movements that decisively shaped the Eastern 
European and Middle Eastern world in the twentieth century: revolutionary socialism as well as 
revolutionary ethnic nationalism among Poles, Armenians, Muslims, Jews, and others. These 
diasporas were hotbeds of Turkism, Zionism, Armenian and other nationalisms.5 
                                                
4 Cf. François Georgeon, Aux origines du nationalisme turc: Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935) 
(Paris: Ed. ADPF, 1980).  For a study of the Russian Turks in late Ottoman Istanbul see 
Volker Adam, Russlandmuslime in Istanbul am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkriegs (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2002). 
5 Cf. my book Vorkämpfer der «neuen Türkei». Revolutionäre Bildungseliten am Genfersee 
(1870–1939) (Zürich: Chronos, 2005); in Turkish: Türklü€e ‹htida. 1870-1939 ‹sviçre'sinde 
yeni Türkiye'nin öncüleri (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2008). 
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“Revolution” in the political history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries means 
legitimizing violence against those considered enemies of the project to be realized. The 
revolutionary project to be realized in the fin de siècle was the abolition of Abdül Hamid 's 
“despotism” in order to make progress and strengthen the empire. The Turkist project to be 
implemented in the 1910s was different: it was to “inject,” as the founders of the Foyers put it, 
into a whole academic generation “the great national goal,” i.e., awakening, educating and 
building up a modern ethno-nation from the Turkish speaking Muslims in Anatolia.6 In 1897, 
Mehmed Reﬂid, pointing to the Hamidian system, had declared “war on those who harass the 
fatherland from within.”7 As sincere as the patriotic commitment of the young doctor may have 
been, it carried in itself a powerful categorical vision of evil. Probably at the end of 1896, he 
asked to hire some “bloodthirsty anarchists” and send them to assassinate the sultan, known as 
the “great despotic satan.”8  The revolutionary hatred was openly expressed in the Young Turks’ 
early imaginations against Abdül Hamid. They frequently used medical and biological metaphors 
to argue “scientifically” what they consider wrong with their enemy.9 
Whereas the broad and influential movement of the Foyers turcs, founded in 1911, had a 
strong Turkist molding, the Committee of Union and Progress, founded twenty-two years earlier, 
was nationalist in a Ottoman Muslim sense. Significantly, both movements originated at the 
Military Medical School, Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Askeriye, in Constantinople.10 At the end of the 
century, the Military Medical School was the meeting point of three elements fundamental to the 
Turkish national movement of the following decades: Western science, elitist political conspiracy 
                                                
6 Yurdcular Yasası, ‹sviçre’de Cenevre ﬂehrine yakın Petit-Lancy Köyünde Pension Racine’de 
kurulan ‹kinci Yurdcular Derne€i’nin muzakerat ve mukerreratı (Istanbul: Yeni Turan 
Matbaası, 1914), p.  21. 
7 Reﬂid, Taﬂkıﬂla Hatıraları,  pp. 60–61. 
8 As he wrote to ‹shak Sükûti of the CUP-center in Geneva (Hanio€lu 1995, 105); ‹brahim 
Temo, ‹ttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti’nin kurucusu ve 1/1 no’lu ‹brahim Temo’nun ‹ttihad ve 
Terakki Anıları (Istanbul: Arba yay., 1987) (originally published,1939), p. 14. 
9 For a poignant example see Osmanlı No. 7, French edition, Geneva, 5 June 1898, 1-2, quoted 
in Kieser, Vorkämpfer, p. 21. 
10 Cf. Sarınay, Yusuf, Türk Milliyetçili€inin Tarihî Geliﬂimi ve Türk Ocakları 1912–1931 
(Istanbul: Ötüken, 1994),  pp. 121–127. 
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and military institution.  A former Tıbbiyeli (student of this school) from the end of the century, 
conveyed the atmosphere and attitude among the students: 
The teachers and students were dominated by a deeply rooted ‘Tıbbiyeli spirit’. 
[…] This school was the first window of the Ottoman Empire open to the Western 
world. Those who studied there turned towards the West. The Tıbbiyeli knew the 
difference between the East and the West, and bitterly resented the pain of being 
backward. For this reason, it was a hotbed of patriotism, of love of freedom, and 
of efforts to deliver us from oriental sloth and to raise us as quickly as possible to 
the high level of civilization peculiar to other countries. The Tıbbiyeli always 
assumed a rebellious attitude toward the despotic and reactionary administration 
of the last Sultans of the Ottoman Empire.11 
“The classrooms and the rooms of the final-year students were all centers of learning. There, one 
read, wrote, treated and discussed everything,” writes Cevrî (probably a pseudonym for Dr 
Reﬂid).12  On 21 May 1889, according to Cevrî, five students from the Military Medical School – 
Arabkirli Abdullah Cevdet, Kafkasyalı Mehmed Reﬂid, Ohrili ‹brahim Edhem (Temo), 
Diyarbakırlı ‹shak Sükûti and Konyalı Hikmet Emin – formed the conspiratorial core that would 
soon assume the name of ‹ttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, Committee for Union and Progress 
(CUP).13  They were all convinced that “the dear fatherland was heading for disaster.”  Mehmed 
Reﬂid wondered how a large secret society could be erected that might win the battle “against the 
great despotic Satan,” Abdül Hamid.  ‹brahim Temo reassured him by pointing to the example of 
the Greek committee Etniki Heteria.14 The conspiracy was sealed by handshake. In 1893, a large 
majority of the Askeri Tıbbiyeli were to be members of the CUP, each with numbers and 
codenames to ensure secrecy. 
 “It was a student’s pleasure which delighted me no end, that we would mock the 
administration, the sultan, people in high positions and other grave matters, and that we would 
make fun of religion,” wrote one Tıbbiyeli.  The Tıbbiyeli called the school laboratory “ the 
                                                
11 Sa€lam, Tevfik, Nasıl Okudum, Istanbul: Atlas & Nehir ‹letiﬂim, 1991 (1959),  74–75. 
12 Cevrî, ‹nkilâb,  50. 
13 Cevrî, ‹nkılâb,  48–51. Cf. Tunaya, Tarık Zafer, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, vol. 3: ‹ttihat ve 
Terakki, bir Ça€ın, bir Kuﬂa€ın, bir Partinin Tarihi, Istanbul: ‹letiﬂim, 1998 (1989),  27. 
14 Temo 1987,  13–15. 
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edifice of wisdom.”15  Man was nature’s product, determined by the laws of nature, by race, and 
by the law of “survival of the fittest.”  In place of God was impersonal nature as conceived by the 
leading sciences of the end of the century (biology, chemistry, physics).  Religion and devotion to 
the Hamidian system went hand-in-hand.  Religious education, which was mandatory in school, 
culminated in the phrase: “Be a soldier under Abdül Hamid Han / He must be obeyed by order of 
the Koran.”  Every evening, in accordance with military discipline, the Tıbbiyeli fell into rank to 
shout “Long live the sultan.”  But they preferred to remain silent or to transform the phrase into a 
curse, and so by contrast devised slogans exalting the fatherland, the nation, freedom and 
science.16 
In a booklet written in 1909, Cevrî informs us of open student propaganda activities in 
response to the great anti-Armenian pogroms of 1894–1896:  “After the painful event which the 
massacre of the Armenians (1310–1312) was, we decided on a new strategy, which on the one 
hand consisted of attracting the attention of Europe, and on the other, of informing the people of 
the crimes committed by the despotic government.17 This greatly frightened the government, for 
in spite of strict police surveillance, we distributed pamphlets in public places and put up many 
declarations for example on the walls of police stations and the palace, or in mosques, schools, 
boats and trams.”  What was the content of these leaflets?  Cevrî sums it up:  
All peoples bearing the title of ‘Ottoman’ are brothers. The massacre of the 
Armenians in Istanbul [August 1896] is a shame to Ottomans, but without a doubt, 
it is not the Turks, but the Hamidian government and its executioners who are to 
blame.  Europe, demanding reforms in Turkey, is making use of this motif and 
wants to declare Turks barbarians and incapable of reforms. In order for the Yıldız 
[the sultan’s palace] not to fall into this trap, one must strive to unite the different 
Ottoman peoples, and to topple the despotic government. In short, if we do not 
wish our destruction, let us unite all Ottoman peoples, and let us strive for freedom 
and to reinstate the law.18  
                                                
15 Sa€lam 1991,  85. 
16 Nur 1967, vol. 1,  123–134 and  252, citation 127, distich cited in Georgeon 1980, 14. Cf. 
Sa€lam 1991,  77–79. 
17 According to the Malî calendar (massacre in Sassun, 1894 - pogrom in Istanbul, 1896). 
18 Cevrî, ‹nkilâb,  52–53. 
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Another CUP leaflet of 1896 used a language less favorable to the Armenians, reproaching their 
defiance of “our state” through “insolent activities.”19  Moreover, the persecution by the 
Hamidian government and anti-Christian clichés, reinforced by the Russian Muslim émigrés, 
wiped out the major crime of the massacres of 1894–96 in the memory of the ‹ttihadists; 
nonetheless, this crime was still prominent in the booklet published in 1909 (probably) by the 
CUP’s co-founder.20 
In 1894, Dr Reﬂid  became assistant to the German professor, Düring Pasha, at the 
hospital of Haydarpasha.  When the Hamidian police learned of his membership of the secret 
organisation, he was arrested and exiled to Libya in 1897.  Soon after his arrest he explained 
himself to soldiers returning from the Greco-Turkish War of the same year, for whom he uses the 
honorific term gazi:  
“Like you, we have waged war for the fatherland.  You have waged war against 
those who have attacked our fatherland from outside, and you have won.  We have 
declared war on those who harass the fatherland from within, and we are sure that 
we will win.  We call to call to account those who ruin our country, exploit our 
villages, and cause our enemies to insult our religion and our nation.  […] The 
Ottoman element is shrinking.  Ottoman land is disappearing piece by piece. Of 
this, we are witnesses, and we know who the culprits are.  In order to make all this 
evil disappear, in order to rescue our working village dwellers and feed them well, 
we have declared war on these libertines, these tyrants, these enemies of the 
fatherland […].”  Speaking these words, I experienced a nervous shudder.  I 
understood that these words that sprang from my mouth mixed with tears were 
making a strong impression on our guardians.21  
This strong feeling of evil, fear of loss and deadly hate of those, considered culprits, make 
up the “nerve” of Reﬂid's “radical personality.” 
                                                
19 Temo 1987, 42. See also points 1 and 2 of the regulations of the CUP in its first years: 
Tunaya, Tarik Zafer, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, vol. 1: ‹kinci Meﬂrutiyet Dönemi, 1908–18, 
Istanbul: ‹letiﬂim, 1998–99, 70. 
20 Cevrî, ‹nkilâb,  37, 42–43 and 52. 
21 Reﬂid, Taﬂkıﬂla Hatıraları ,  57–63, quotation 60–61. 
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For ten years, Reﬂid stayed in Tripoli as a doctor in state service. There, sometime in 
1901-1902, he married Mazlûme Hanım, daughter of adjutant major Ziya Bey, who was also 
living in exile.  He seems to have had a happy time there, devoted to his family, to his job at the 
hospital, to discussions with his friends and to some endeavors in education.  In 1900 he 
prompted the exiles to open a library in which lectures were given to the inhabitants on basic 
subjects.22  After the Young Turk revolution, in August 1908, Mehmed Reﬂid returned from 
Tripoli to Constantinople with his other exiled friends.  In December, he was promoted to 
adjutant major, and worked as a military doctor for a couple of months. At the end of 1908, he 
tried to establish himself politically in the capital.  It is during this time that he very probably 
wrote a booklet on the genesis of the Young Turk revolution.23  “In order better to serve my 
country, I found it necessary to change my profession.”  On 20 August 1909, he resigned from 
military service.24 
In the capital, the old exile became involved in politics. It seems surprising to see him 
temporarily associate himself with the movement of Prince Sabahaddin, which was constituted as 
a liberal party, Fırka-i Ahrar, in September 1908.25 Why did Reﬂid Bey want to join them?  We 
lack sufficient information to provide a clear and straightforward answer.  Like the other 
surviving founders of the CUP, he was no longer at the center of the party he had founded. What 
appealed to him in Sabahaddin’s group was no doubt the emphasis laid on private initiative, for 
he was skeptical of the state as it presented itself at the time, with Hamidian functionaries still in 
place.26  Besides, he was not against decentralization on condition that it would take place under 
the roof of Muslim unity.27  But the prince’s consideration for minorities could hardly have 
pleased him. In the tense atmosphere prevailing in the capital after the attempted coup of April 
1909 (31 Mart Vakası), those with political ambitions had to tread carefully.  As a matter of fact, 
                                                
22 Hanio€lu 1995, 207. 
23 Cevrî 1909. 
24 Reﬂid, Hal Tercümesi, 164. 
25 Tunaya 1998, vol. 1, 175. 
26 Cf. Reﬂid’s memorandum of 14 October 1904 to the Hamidian authorities, in which he 
criticizes the insufficiency and irresponsibility of the Ottoman administration at Tripolis. Bilgi 
1997, 17. 
27 Reﬂid, Hatıraları, 79–80. 
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in the same year, Dr Reﬂid found himself no longer associated with Sabahaddin.  Looking back, 
Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, a friend and disciple of the prince, wrote: “Recognizing that the 
Committee for Union and Progress was unwilling to compromise, a few figures from Teﬂebbüsü 
ﬁahsi [Sabahaddin’s Party of Private Initiative]…came to terms with Union and Progress by 
accepting the positions offered to them.…  Dr Reﬂid was among those who changed sides.”28 
On October 9, 1909, Mehmed Reﬂid was installed as kaymakam of ‹stanköy in the 
Archipelago. In February 1910 he was promoted to mutasarrıf of Hums in the province of Tripoli 
(Lebanon), only to be removed in June 1911, accused by the provincial authorities of having 
failed to remain impartial in the administrative affairs of the sancak.29  A memorandum on the 
state of Tripoli in Libya, probably addressed to the vali there, sheds light on possible further 
reasons behind his frequent transfers.  Dr Reﬂid complains of the grave insufficiency of medical 
care and preventative measures for civilian travelers in the kaza of Mısrat.  He gives advice, and 
warns of the possibility of dire consequences for the entire province.  This conduct, as justified as 
it might have been, was rather audacious for a kaymakam but was framed by a militant patriotic 
discourse: “My life bears witness to the fact that your servant does not waste his time on 
speeches, but instead devotes himself to action and to effort. I am proud of having been, at the 
age of seventeen, among the founders of Union and Progress….  Since that time, my life has 
served to bewail the misfortune of my nation and my country and to exact revenge on those 
responsible for this misfortune.”30  He gave an example of his zeal “for the defense of the rights 
of his country” by retelling an event that had occurred during the month preceding the revolution 
of 1908, when the parliament of the city of Tripoli (Libya) presided by Hasan Pasha wished to 
“give one of the most respectable landed properties to the Italians out of friendship for Nejad 
Bey, son of the vali. Mehmed Reﬂid regarded this action as a crime against the fatherland: “In 
order to excite religious fervor [gayret-i diniye] and national zeal [hamiyet-i milliye], I was not 
ashamed to execrate the entire despotic government, including Abdül Hamid.” In a note above 
                                                
28 Kuran, Ahmed Bedevi, ‹nkılap Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler, Istanbul: Kaynak, 2000 (1945), 
328. Cf. Bilgi 1997,  18–19. 
29 With the ‹ttihadists in place, however, the Osmanlı ‹ttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti Hums Livâ 
Heyet-i Merkeziyesi thanked him in a letter of 19/20 June for his valuable services to the 
nation, the fatherland and the party; Bilgi 1997, 20–21. 
30 Reﬂid, Arzi, 175–176 
10 
 
 10 
the line, he explains: “In crying out publicly that all those who perpetrated such a crime – Abdül 
Hamid, the vali, the city council – were traitors, I took neither my situation nor my future into 
account, nor even my own life, and proved that life would be without value to me if the 
fatherland were lost.”31  Here again is a demonstration of Reﬂid's radical personality as a 
committed patriot. 
His patriotic confession was coupled with the conviction of having rendered excellent 
services as governor of Hums. He emphasizes the order and discipline acquired thanks to his 
kaymakamlık.  Toward the end of the text, he declares, “Consequently, it is clear that I shall 
continue, as I have always done, to pursue with all my strength the duty which I consider as 
sacred as my honor.”32  One hardly doubts the good faith of the author of this memorandum, who 
proudly presents himself as founder of the CUP, fervent patriot and man of action.  Even so, his 
intransigence is disconcerting.  With the fervor of a Jacobean, he declares himself prepared to 
sacrifice everything for the highest patriotic value. Reserving no special treatment for either local 
notables or higher authorities, he wants to vent his anger on all those responsible in his eyes for 
the sufferings of “my nation.”  By the outbreak of the War of Tripoli (September 1911– October 
1912), we are dealing with a functionary Reﬂid prepared to go very far for his ideals. 
After a brief intermezzo as mutasarrıf of Kozan, on July 25, 1911, Reﬂid Bey was 
appointed mutasarrıf of Lazistan (Rize), a post from which he was removed on September 10, 
1912 for his belligerent behavior.  Administrative inquiries followed that would, on November 7, 
1912, return to Mehmed Reﬂid the right to continue in his office.  Süleyman Nazif, at the time 
employed in the vilayet of Trebizond, in a retrospective article described the mutasarrıf of 
Lazistan as a legalist (kanunperest).  But his incorruptible character inspired personal respect, and 
promoted discipline within the administration.33  It is not until after the establishment of the 
CUP's dictatorship on January 23, 1913 that we see Mehmed Reﬂid once again solidly installed in 
a position. On June 7, 1913 he was very briefly reinstalled in Lazistan, and then, on July 8, 1913, 
appointed mutasarrıf of Karesi (province of Balıkesir), where he remained until 23 July 1914.34 
                                                
31 Reﬂid, Arzi, 176. 
32 “namusum derecesinde mukaddes bildi€im vazifemi”, Reﬂid, Arzi, 177. 
33 “Doktor Reﬂid”, Hadisat, 8 ﬁubat 1919, entirely transliterated in Bilgi 1997, 167–171, here  
168–169. 
34 Bilgi 1997, 21. 
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At Karesi, for the first time, the patriotic fervor of Dr Reşid was expressed through large-
scale anti-Christian actions. He was one of the protagonists of the policy of illegal expulsion of 
Greeks from the Aegean coast, a violent policy hardly concealed from diplomatic circles, and 
executed by party and government organs. The İttihadists saw it as retaliation for the evil which, 
according to them, the Muslims under Greek domination had been suffering since the Balkan 
Wars.35  The person of the mutasarrıf of Karesi united party and government affiliation.  His 
hasty deployment to the region seems to have served appropriate plans.  Foremost, he devoted his 
office to the expulsion of the Rumlar (Greek-Orthodox Ottomans) and to the resettlement, to 
Bulgaristan, of the Bulgarians from the cities and villages of his government.  Anti-Christian 
attitudes among İttihadist had come to the political surface and become radicalized during the 
Balkan Wars of 1912–1913.  A year before the entry of the Ottoman Empire into World War I, 
the key players in the CUP had formed a highly destructive view of the Anatolian Christians as “a 
mortal worry,” as a race and a privileged class to be combated; as a “tumor” requiring an 
operation.  Celal [Bayar] Bey, head of the Smyrna cell of Union and Progress in 1914, confirms 
in his memoirs that the CUP and the ministry of war, run by Enver since January 3, 1914, were, 
parallel to the regular activities of the government, working towards the liquidation of 
“concentrations of non-Muslims” in the Aegean region, and he details the methods of 
intimidation used in order to “encourage” them to emigrate. 36  Especially after the international 
                                                
35 While the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria in November 1913 concluded the first 
intergovernemental treaty for population transfer in modern history, talks with Greece did not 
happen. Therefore the ‹ttihadists implemented secret politics of expulsion by spreading panic 
in the Rum villages from the beginning of 1914. Cf. BOA DH.KMS 17/29, cited in Bilgi 1997, 
22; Ladas, Stephen, The exchange of minorities. Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, New York: 
Macmillan, 1932,  18–23; Naimark, Norman M., Fires of hatred: ethnic cleansing in 
twentieth-century Europe, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 2001, 43. 
ﬁenﬂekerci, Erkan, Türk devriminde Celal Bayar, 1918–1960, Istanbul: Alfa, 2000,  35–41. 
36 Bayar, Celal, Ben de yazdım, vol. 5, Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1965–67, 1573. The 
nationalist author Nurdo€an Taçalan wrote in 1970: “Union and Progress had taken a final 
decision. The sources of trouble had to be eliminated, the Rumlar had to be eliminated by 
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powerful needed to be broken and destroyed” (Taçalan, Nurdo€an, Ege'de Kurtuluﬂ Savaﬂı 
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reactivation of the reform issue for the Eastern Provinces in 1913, the İttihadists established 
negative views of the Armenians similar to those of the Rumlar.  The reactivation of the 
“Armenian reforms” had to do with the fact, that the CUP had not been able to solve, as had been 
agreed with the Armenian Dashnaktsutiun (its electoral partner since 1908), the agrarian question 
in the Eastern provinces, which would have meant the restitution of Armenian property taken, 
mostly by Kurds during the great pogroms in the 1890s. 
The Balıkesir Notları of Mehmed Reﬂid contain a blend of social frustration and 
nationalistic aversion. During an excursion between July 29 and August 7, 1913, he recorded the 
then current state of affairs, and projected a “better” future without Rumlar, writing on paper 
bearing the letterhead “Secretariat of the mutasarrıflık of Karesi”.37  The dream of a modern 
administration and infrastructure went hand-in-hand with the establishment of unrestricted 
Turkish-Muslim political, economic, and demographic domination. What resulted, was a 
polarized image: on the one hand, the Rumlar, socially envied and viewed all the less favorably 
because they were prospering in many places; and on the other hand, the good Muslims and their 
(sic!) state, which must be strengthened at all cost, because they were subject to exploitation and 
Christian intrigues. 
In summer 1913, Mehmed Reﬂid was thus a high ‹ttihadist functionary who, in his private 
notes, no longer considered the Ottoman Rumlar as compatriots (vatandaﬂlar), but as 
“foreigners” and internal enemies against whom the severest measures needed to be taken, 
including expropriation and expulsion.  His excursion seems to have been the preparation for this.  
In Karesi his rigorousness fuelled dispositions that bore the imprint of social and national hate 
and of social, economic, ethnic and demographic engineering. The goal was the installation of 
modern national structures, visible through good roads, tramways, beautiful public buildings, and 
the absence of multiculturalism.  One had to shatter the regional reality as it then existed.  The 
towns and villages needed to be re-planned in order to strengthen the Muslim element and 
concentrate economic prosperity into its hands.  Functionaries were needed who were more 
nationalist, as well as a police force that was better equipped. 
                                                                                                                                                        
baﬂlarken, Istanbul: Milliyet, 1970, 65, cited in Akçam, Taner, ‹nsan Hakları ve Ermeni 
Sorunu. ‹ttihad ve Terakki’den Kurtulus Savaﬂı’na, Ankara: Imge, 1999, 179). 
37 Cf. Bilgi 1997, 46. 
13 
 
 13 
Let us take a closer look at the Balıkesir Notları.  On the first day in ‹vrindi, he notes, 
“The [local] Rumlar have stayed perfectly Rum, made rich thanks to the Balya [mining] 
Company.”38  The following day in Edremit he accused the kaymakam of being “too closely and 
disagreeably connected with the [Orthodox] metropolitan.”  With regard to the villages, he 
writes, “In this region, the villagers [Muslims] do relatively well.  But they cannot duly profit 
from their produce or, better said, from their hard work.  The monopolists and oppressors [Rum] 
do not permit them to open their eyes.”  Here once again, the social cleavage which the author 
denounces is also seen in terms of ethnic opposition.  Continuing, he writes, “In Edremit, a 
national and a commercial sentiment have awakened. A rivalry directed against the Christians has 
arisen.”39  What also disturbs the modernity projected by Reﬂid is the nomad phenomenon. “Here 
[in the region of Ilıca] there are Wallachs, coming from Teselya as nomads.…  By the fact that 
they are mobile and nomadic, they constitute a risk to security. Some of them work as sawyers. 
They must all be expelled.”40 
Ayvalık appealed to Dr Reﬂid, but it was “unfortunately a Greek [Yunan] city. The city is 
extremely prosperous, very ordered, the houses are very pretty. But the inhabitants are generally 
Rum.  The writings in the shops are Greek [Rumca]; even the street names are Greek. The 
government has not been paying enough attention here.”41  To counter the weight of the Rumlar, 
he suggested as an urgent measure to “attach a few Muslim villages to the kaza and to establish 
active and prosperous [Muslim] traders and farmers on the territory of the kasaba.  He considered 
it “necessary that in Ayvalık, the police officers were not indigenous non-Muslims, but that they 
still knew the [Greek] language.”  What he found particularly “detestable” was the fact that the 
town hall building was the property of the metropolitan.  On Yunda, an exclusively Rum island 
near Ayvalık, the mutasarrıf deemed it “reasonable to introduce suitable immigrants [muhacir] 
there.  Establishing a business-oriented and prosperous colony of Muslims who know the olive 
trade will help in keeping an eye on the Rumlar [Rumluk].”42  At the next halt in his journey, in 
Burhaniye, “a kasaba of 1700 houses, of which around 700 are Rum houses”, he once again 
                                                
38 Reﬂid, Balıkesir Notları, 65. 
39 Reﬂid, Balıkesir Notları, 66. 
40 Reﬂid, Balıkesir Notları, 68. 
41 Reﬂid, Balıkesir Notları, 69. 
42 Reﬂid, Balıkesir Notları, 70. 
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complained of the fact that “unfortunately,” the Rumlar were in control of commerce.43  A visit to 
the Balya Company confirmed his anti-Rum views.  “The top management is made up of a few 
strangers, generally Rumlar and in particular, Greeks [Yunanlı], the lower employees are Laz, 
Kurds and Turks.”  In order better to control the firm, he deemed it appropriate to “dismiss the 
secretary general of the firm, Prodromos, the chief engineer Kokitos and the head worker.”44  He 
henceforth appeared to conceptualize late Ottoman society in sweeping antagonistic categories of 
Islam and Turkishness versus Christianity, Rumluk and Ermenilik [Armenians]. 
The anti-Christian discourse, fed by social envy, became even more radical with regard to 
the Armenians portrayed as leeches of the Muslim element.45  According to him, as secretaries 
and bookkeepers to sheikhs, aghas and Kurdish beys, they have subjected the latter “to the 
slavery of their economy”. As to the acts of violence committed by the tribes, in his eyes the first 
victims were the Muslim villagers, while the Armenians remain unscathed due to “the toadyism 
and base flattery peculiar to them.”  We see here the same set of arguments as can be found in the 
anti-Semitism of the time. We find also the specter of biologism.  In their “prosperous and 
fortunate” villages, the Armenians increase their population.  Contrary to official ‹ttihadist 
statistics careful to show a decreasing number of Armenians, Dr Reﬂid insisted the Armenian 
population was growing and used this as an argument against claims that they were being 
persecuted.  Contradicting his and the CUP's own earlier sayings, he suppressed his knowledge 
about the anti-Armenian mass crimes of the 1890s. 
His categories blended together “the enemy” of race, class and religion, as did most 
Turkists in the 1910s.  “Due to privileges too easily given, and also due to their own initiative,” 
wrote the Turkist and later Kemalist writer Moiz Kohen Tekinalp, the Christians of Asia Minor 
were “always more prosperous, increasingly driving out the true masters [sic!] of the land”. 
According to Tekinalp, the Armenians had “enriched themselves thanks to their good relations 
with the English.”  With regard to the sacred goal of a national economy, millî iktisad, he 
ascertained with satisfaction, and without the slightest remorse that the widespread boycott 
                                                
43 Reﬂid, Balıkesir Notları, 71. 
44 Reﬂid, Balıkesir Notları, 75. 
45 “‹slam unsurunun kanını emmekdedirler” – in a text from the end of 1918 which 
retrospectively refers to Reﬂid's experiences in Diyarbekir, Dr Reﬂid Reﬂid, Mülâhazât, 97–99. 
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movement (carried out before the secret expulsions in the first half of 1914) had “ruined hundreds 
of Greek and Armenian tradesmen.”46 
Unlike earlier cases, Mehmed Reﬂid does not seem to have ended his time in office in 
Karesi after falling out with local notables or regional authorities.  He did pride himself on having 
removed the Rumlar without giving rise to protest.47  It was to the perfect satisfaction of the 
central government that he appeared to have fulfilled his task of organizing the deportations and 
grappling with infrastructural modernization. He found himself promoted to the rank of vali in 
July 1914, while at the same time his close party comrade, the minister of the interior, Tâlât 
Pasha, proposed a particularly delicate post to him.  In a letter of July 19, 1914, Tâlât insisted on 
offering him the charge of “secretary general of the inspectorate of the provinces of Van, Bitlis, 
Diyarbakır, and Mamuretülaziz,” while commending his devotion, his capabilities and his 
efficiency.48  The international reform plan for the six Eastern Provinces, signed by the Porte 
under diplomatic pressure – also from Germany – on February 8, 1914, made provisions for two 
powerful inspectors from neutral countries. They were to control the process of reform, designed 
to stabilize the fragile coexistence of ethnic groups, enable the participation of all groups in 
regional politics, and establish a functioning rule of law. 
But this plan ran counter to the CUP's will to centralization, full sovereignty and Turkist 
“nationalization” of Anatolia at the expense of the regions and the Christians. Indeed, the plan 
was rigorously denounced by the CUP as a first step toward Armenian autonomy, which would 
finally lead to Russian annexation.  It was therefore necessary to hinder the imposed inspectorate 
as much as possible.  The person best suitable for this task was Dr Reﬂid.  Yet he would not take 
up his new office.  The First World War offered the opportunity to get rid of the embarrassing 
question of reforms, which had been persistently raised diplomatically ever since the Congress of 
Berlin (1878).49  On  August 13, 1914, three days before his superior, Inspector General Hoff, 
                                                
46 Alp, Tekin, Türkismus und Pantürkismus, Weimar: Verlag Gustav Kiepenheuer, 1915,  39–
40 and 62 (”Tekinalp” became Moiz Kohen alias Tekin Alp Bey's later family name in the 
Republic of Turkey). 
47 Bilgi 1997, 22. 
48 Letter partly cited in Bilgi 1997, 22. 
49 ”Fortunately World War One broke out thus preventing the implementation of that harmful 
[reform] project”, a member of the Turkish Historical Society later wrote, who was an 
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would be called back from Van, and without a replacement being appointed, Reﬂid Bey was 
named vali of Diyarbakır.50 
He immediately saw himself placed into other postings closer to the front: From 
September 10, he was vali of Basra, which fell on November 20.51  From November 24, 1914 
until December 25 he was vice vali of Baghdad, probably to keep an eye on the vali, Süleyman 
Nazif, a critic of the régime.52  “At that point I found the mutasarrıf of Lazistan to have 
changed!… Instead of the old poised character and calm, there was an appalling arrogance and 
anger,” wrote the old vali in 1919, remembering that month in 1914.53 From January 10 to 
February 25, 1915, Dr Reﬂid was vali of Mossul.  Finally, he replaced Governor Hamid 
(Kapancı) Bey, whose valilik in Diyarbakır from  September 17, 1914 to March 25, 1915 was 
distinguished by a relatively tolerant policy toward the Armenians, contrary to the wishes of the 
CUP.54  Reﬂid Bey’s judgment of Hamid Bey was harsh.  “My predecessor did not govern. 
Totally indifferent, and giving himself to pleasure and amusement, he threw the affairs of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
employee of the Ministry of the Interior in 1914: Tankut, Hasan Reﬂit, “Do€u ve Güneydo€u 
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government into great chaos, and reduced the state’s hold to zero.”55 Dr Reﬂid governed the 
province of Diyarbakır until March 2, 1916. 
A functionary and party member who had been radicalized in his thoughts and actions 
since 1909 and deeply frustrated by the first months of the war, became governor of Diyarbakır in 
1915.   According to his own words, he “removed” 120,000 Armenians from his province, of 
which the majority were massacred, or died from exhaustion. 56  This figure is nearly double the 
official Ottoman number of Armenians in the province of Diyarbakır.57  It corresponds roughly 
with that given by contemporary observers for the autochthonous Christians killed in the 
province.58 
What happened in Diyarbakır was already evident from testimony from foreign observers 
who were political friends of the Ottoman Empire.  On July 31, 1915, the German ambassador in 
Constantinople informed the Chancellor of the Reich, Bethmann Hollweg, in Berlin of the 
murder of the Christians, saying, “Since the beginning of this month, the vali of Diyarbakır, 
Reﬂid Bey, has begun the systematic extermination of the Christian population in his province, 
without distinguishing between race or creed.”59  Why did the vali act in this way? A few months 
later, he explained himself during a conversation in Constantinople with Mithat ﬁükrü (Bleda), 
secretary general of Union and Progress at the time.  His words express open social envy, an 
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obsession with a general conspiracy, and the Social Darwinist idea that it was necessary to kill 
collectively in order collectively to survive.  “We will liquidate them before they eliminate us.” 
There is the vision of a politically poisoned Armenian people, extending to a dehumanizing 
image of Armenian “bandits” and “microbes” within the “organism of the fatherland.”  To 
eliminate them was the duty with which the vali Dr Reﬂid saw himself to be charged.  Explicitly, 
he abandoned the medical code of ethics where the salvation of Turkishness was concerned.   
Either they us, or we them.  In this situation, I thought to myself: “Hey, Dr Reﬂid! 
There are two alternatives: Either the Armenians will liquidate the Turks, or the 
Turks will liquidate them!”…  Faced with the necessity of having to choose, I did 
not hesitate for long. My Turkishness triumphed over my identity as a doctor.  
Before they do away with us, we will get rid of them, I said to myself.…  But I did 
not accomplish this deed either to satisfy my personal pride or to enrich myself.  I 
had seen that the fatherland [vatan] was about to be lost, therefore, I proceeded 
eyes closed and without consideration, convinced that I was acting for the welfare 
of the nation.  If my own [national] history were to call me to account for this, my 
conduct – nothing doing.  The history of other peoples may write about me what it 
will, it does not trouble me in the least.…  The Armenian bandits were a load of 
harmful microbes that had afflicted the body of the fatherland. Was it not the duty 
of the doctor to kill the microbes?60 
When Reﬂid Bey arrived in Diyarbakır at the end of March 1915, he was confronted with 
a situation difficult in several regards. The state had little authority, the security forces were 
weak, the population was agitated and anxious, while the large number of deserters, Muslims and 
non-Muslims, made internal security problems more acute. The Muslims feared an invasion by 
the Russians, who had been victorious since the Ottoman defeat at Sarıkamıﬂ, while on the 
western front, the British were preparing the invasion of Gallipoli. What was feared by some was 
a hope to others. The Christians had suffered the most from frequently brutal requisitions since 
general mobilization in August 1914.  Their stores in the bazaar in Diyarbakır had been burnt and 
looted on August 19, 1914.61  The memory of the great massacres of the end of the century was 
still fresh. To many Armenians and especially the young people, a good number of whom were 
                                                
60 Güngör 1953,  2444–45. 
61 Ternon 2002, 83. Cf. Kieser 2000,  335–336. 
19 
 
 19 
deserters, the abolition of the reform plan for the Eastern Provinces and the voluntary entry into 
the war on the side of Germany had destroyed any acceptable prospect of life under the regime 
currently in place, whose downfall they were hoping for.  Sometimes, they audaciously expressed 
their views in the streets or in the cafés. They were aware of the disarming of the Armenian 
soldiers, separated into work battalions since February and exposed to massacre. Aggravating the 
situation in the provinces was the fact that, ever since the centralizing reforms of the Tanzimat, 
the tribes, mostly Kurdish but also Nestorian, were rebellious and the institution of the state did 
not function properly in their region. 
Mehmed Reﬂid learned of the great number of Armenian deserters (he does not mention 
the numerous Muslim deserters).  He was appalled by the fact that they moved freely even in the 
city.  They were impertinent in his eyes, and he thought he heard them say, in the hope of a rapid 
Russian breakthrough:  “Up to now, you have been the ruling nation [millet-i hâkime], but now it 
is for us to dominate, and for you to be subjugated.”62  He saw or believed to see them as well 
armed, organized and conspiring to stage a general rebellion.  In equal manner, an important 
number of Muslims in the city were also seized by the specter of a Christian conspiracy.  These 
he ably succeeded in submitting to his will and organizing, before he delivered a fatal blow to the 
Christian minority.  More than fear, however, it was probably booty that compelled them to line 
up behind, or even urge on the new vali.  If Süleyman Nazif is to be believed, many Muslims 
feared him and hated him for his brutality.  According to Nazif, it was exclusively the lower 
masses, together with the militia and policemen brought in from outside, who participated in 
pillaging and murdering the Armenians.  “I have learned with satisfaction that in Diyarbakır, not 
a single notable has been involved in the matters of deportation and massacre”, Süleyman Nazif 
wrote in 1919.63 
This however is not entirely true.  Rather it is a statement typical of the months after the 
First World War, when Muslim patriots, among them Nazif, made up the Association for the 
Defense of the National Rights in the Eastern Provinces.  The propaganda of this Association had 
an interest in placing all blame on Dr Reﬂid and the men he brought with him.  The fact is that 
several local notables had closely collaborated with the vali, among them Pirinççizâde Feyzi and 
Cemilpaﬂazâde Mustafa, both sons of local dignitaries and  responsible of the anti-Armenian 
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massacres  in 1895.  That earlier massacre, as well as the existence of a self-assured local 
committee called Young Turk (of which by the way young Nazif had been a propelling 
ideologist), not to mention a long, strongly anti-Armenian telegram defying the sultan that had 
been sent to the sultan by this committee on November 4, 1895, all suggest a powerful long-term 
anti-Christian potential and agency in Diarbekir.  This has to be considered as a factor for the 
particularly murderous outcome in that province, beside reasons related to Dr Reﬂid himself. 
Several of the notables cooperating with Dr Reﬂid threw their lot in with the nationalist 
organization put up in 1919.64  This is true, for example, of Pirinççizâde Feyzi, a deputy of the 
Ottoman parliament and representative of the CUP club in the city.  Together with a second 
deputy of Diyarbakır, Zulfi Bey, he had agitated for the dismissal of the moderate vali, Hamid. 
As his interview with the British vice-consul of Diyarbakır on August 27, 1914 demonstrates, 
Feyzi believed in a funny mixture of Panislamism and Panturkism, hoping – like Enver – 
miracles from the war to come.  If the Armenians were really loyal, he said, they would instigate 
rebellion against Russian rule in the Caucasus in favor of the Ottomans.  In a language similar to 
that of other high CUP members in 1914, he openly threatened the Armenians with destruction.65  
He was vice-president of the local High Council, which the new vali founded and presided over, 
and organized the murder of deportees by Kurdish tribes. Thus at the end of May 1915 he seems 
to have made a trip to the region of Djezireh (Cizre), bargained there with Kurdish chiefs and 
finally taken with him as aides-de-camps Amaro and Mustafa, the sons of the late Ibrahim Pasha, 
head of the tribal confederation of the Milli.  Whereas Ibrahim had protected all Christians under 
his influence during the pogroms of 1895, Amaro’s men were organized as murderers of the 
deportees.66 
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Dr Reﬂid had brought with him a loyal troop of around 30 men, mainly Circassians. It was 
a strike force, probably linked to the Teﬂkilat-i Mahsusa.67  They were joined by the policemen 
already there.  Furthermore, a militia of about a thousand volunteers, partly criminals, was 
organized under the command of Cemilpaﬂazâde Mustafa.68  Strengthened by this support, the 
vali succeeded in searching all the Armenian houses in the city, arrested hundreds of deserters, 
and confiscated a large quantity of arms.69  In perfect keeping with what had been organized in 
the cities of other provinces, the vali of Diyarbakır demanded the immediate surrender of the 
deserters and their arms, and, in order to intimidate and paralyze the Armenians, had the heads of 
the community arrested and tortured. Among the 1600 notables arrested in April and at the 
beginning of May, there were also Assyrians. 
On May 25, 1915 the müfti (religious official) listed the names of the prisoners that had 
been assembled in the court of the prison and read them a telegram from the capital that 
announced their deportation to Mosul.70  According to one source, the müfti Ibrahim and the kadi 
Necib asked in the following decisive meeting of the High Council to spare the Armenian 
children from the planned comprehensive destruction by converting them to Islam.  But Dr Reﬂid  
Feyzi, Zülfi and others were opposed.71  In June, when the general deportation began, the müfti 
succeeded, however, in convincing several families to apostatize in order to save their lives. 
According to the Dominican missionary J. Rhétoré, 350 Armenian families of the Gregorian 
(Armenian Apostolic) faith, 25 Armenian Catholic, and 12 Chaldean families converted.  For 
each conversion the family of the müfti was said to have received an considerable sum of 
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money.72  But these Islamized families were, nevertheless, later deported in agreement with the 
explicit policy of the ministry of the interior.73 
A witness by the name of Floyd Smith, a doctor associated with American missionaries 
(the ABCFM) in Diyarbakır since 1913, describes the searches and arrests as follows: “The 
police in searching houses took anything they wished. Books and papers were sure to bring 
condemnation to a household.  Rape of women was a common accompaniment of police 
research.  Finally the prisons were full and Typhus began. – It had been present throughout the 
winter in the city.”74  Right up to the first weeks of the valilik of Reﬂid, Dr Smith enjoyed intact 
relations with the government.  Afterwards, the vali refused any meeting with the “colleague”. 
Because of his work, Dr Smith was perfectly aware of what was happening in the Christian 
quarter.  He confirms the government’s precarious position in view of the general problem of 
desertion before the arrival of Mehmed Reﬂid:   
During the winter many Armenians had evaded military service by means of the 
roofs. (One who knows Diyarbakır realises that it is possible for an expert to go at 
all over the city and not descend unto the street.)  A far larger force of police than 
was at hand would have been necessary to apprehend these men. They finally 
became so confident of their ability to avoid capture that they played cards etc. 
almost under the Vali’s nose (this was the first vali [Hamid Bey] we had during 
                                                
72 Rhétoré, J., Les chrétiens aux bêtes! Souvenirs de la guerre sainte proclamée par les Turcs 
contre les chrétiens en 1915, manuscript in the Bibliothèque du Saulchoir, Paris,  35–36, cited 
in Ternon 2002, 94. 
73 Telegram of 20 July 1915, BOA DH.ﬁFR 54-A/49. 
74 The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission, the strongest and best 
established missionary organization in Asia Minor during the last Ottoman decades.  Dr Smith 
mentions several Christian notables having been tortured and finally killed. Many died from 
typhus. He could not get access to the suffering people. “Metassian, the representative of the 
Standard Oil, was taken down in prison.…  They refused me admittance [into the prison] 
rather rudely asking what business I had there.  One of the guards said: ‘Let him die like a 
dog.’  He died that same afternoon.”  [Letter to James Barton, Vevey (Switzerland), 18 
September 1915,  3–4, Archives of the ABCFM, Houghton Library, Boston, ABC 16.9.7 (reel 
716: 436)] 
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our stay). He at last became incensed and gave the Gregorian Bishop 
[Tchilgadian] to understand that unless these men surrendered, drastic measures 
would be undertaken. On the strength of this the Bishop and the Dragoman of the 
vilayet [Dikran Ilvanian] went upon the roofs and lectured the men, telling them 
that they were bringing ruin upon themselves and the whole Christian quarter. As 
a result quite a number surrendered. This occurred the last of February. 
Floyd Smith makes it clear to what extent the situation worsened with the arrival of the 
new governor:  
The vali was superseded early in March.75  By getting a large force of police and 
gendarmes the new vali [Reﬂid Bey] succeeded in apprehending the larger part of 
these men. He soon started the imprisonment of prominent Armenians using as 
justification the false statement that they were sheltering deserters.…  Then a 
search for arms was made and several bombs unearthed, some rifles and 
ammunition found. Evidently there was a revolutionary committee and some ideas 
in some heads of doing things, but I am sure that the large majority of Christians 
were opposed to any such proceedings.  Most people had weapons in their houses 
in remembrance of the event of twenty years ago, but I feel positive that there was 
no idea of a general uprising. About the first of April a proclamation was posted 
demanding arms. Men were imprisoned right and left and tortured to make them 
confess the presence and place of concealments of arms. Some went mad under 
the torture.76  
Confessions of some sort were extracted.  An Armenian close to the ABCFM was made to sign 
an absurd document saying that the ABCFM was preparing an insurrection in Diyarbakır and that 
its “agent”, Dr Smith, was an Armenian.77  According to what he wrote in 1918, Dr Reﬂid seems 
to have believed the shocking “confessions” extracted under torture.  Recently published minutes 
                                                
75 Officially on 25 March only. 
76 Letter to James Barton, Vevey (Switzerland), 18 September 1915,  2–3, ABC 16.9.7 (reel 
716: 434–436). 
77 Reﬂid Bey had persons from the entourage of Dr Smith tortured and one of them sign that 
“1. I (Dr Smith) am an Armenian, 2. I (Dr Smith) was Maynard’s agent to incite insurrection 
in Diyarbekir as at Van.” Smith’s letter to Barton, Vevey, 25 August 1915, ABC 16.9.7. 
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of those interrogations give, between the lines, moving insights into the despair and disunity of 
the local Armenians.78 
Even in the extreme case of mass murder in the province of Diyarbakır in 1915, where the 
border line between victims and perpetrators was ethno-religiously given, the perpetrators wanted 
that some representatives of the targeted group admit to have concretely acted as traitors against 
the existing order.  Contrary to Turkish apologetic schemas, the Van “rebellion” after April 20, 
1915 could not serve as “proff” for the Armenians' general uprising and thus argument for their 
removal, since the systematic anti-Armenian persecution in Diyarbakır simply began earlier.  The 
prisoners who did not die under torture were massacred after the end of May, when the full-scale 
liquidation of the Christians commenced.  Expelled, Dr Smith was made to leave before the final 
drama started.  The government confiscated the property of the ABCFM within the city.79  The 
rapid and voluntary deterioration of intact relations between local functionaries and the ABCFM, 
an organization rooted in the vilayet of Diyarbakır for three generations, is a strong sign of the 
negative “new spirit” that the emissaries of the CUP brought with them to the Eastern Provinces 
in the Spring of 1915. 80 
In application of the Law on abandoned property of 25 May 1915, Dr Reﬂid founded a 
commission for the administration of the deportees' property.  As in other places, instead of its 
declared goal, i.e. protection, the commission served to transfer the Christian goods to the 
Muslims – “mass murder cum robbery” (Christian Gerlach).  Contrary to the régime's intention 
however, the members of the High Council profited the most.81  On May 30, 1915, the arrested 
Christian representatives of the provincial capital were brought to the Tigris near the town, put on 
kelek (rafts) on the Tigris and several days later slaughtered at agreed places.  Walter Holstein, 
the German vice consul in Mosul, told the embassy what was happening in the neighboring 
province. On June 10, Holstein wrote:  
                                                
78 T. C. Genelkurmay Baﬂkanlı€ı, Arﬂiv belgeleriyle Ermeni faaliyetleri 1914–1918/ Armenian 
activities in the archive documents 1914–1918, Ankara: Genelkurmay Basım Evi, 2005, vol. 
1,  235-81. 
79 Smith’s letter to Barton, Rowley (Iowa), 20 Septembre 1917, ABC 16.9.7. 
80 Cf. Dr Smith’s (Diyarbekir) and Dr Thom’s (who had lived for 40 years at Mardin) letters to 
Barton from 1914 to March 1915, ABC 16.9.7 (reels 716 and 717). 
81 Faits et documents 1920,  45–48, cited in Ternon 2002, 95. 
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614 Armenian men, women and children banished from Diyarbakır have all been 
slaughtered on the journey here by raft; Keleks arrived here empty yesterday; for a 
few days now, corpses and human members have been floating by in the river. 
Further transports of Armenian ‘emigrants’ are on the way here, with the same 
fate awaiting them. I have expressed my deepest revulsion toward these crimes to 
the local government; the local vali expresses his regret, noting that the vali of 
Diyarbakır alone bears responsibility.…  The massacre of the Armenians in the 
vilayet of Diyarbakır is becoming increasingly known here and is creating 
growing unrest among the local population, which can easily give rise to 
unforeseen consequences in face of the incomprehensible irresponsibility and 
weakness of the local government. In the districts of Mardin and Amadia, 
conditions have developed into a true persecution of Christians.82 
The vali now had the community stripped of its leaders and began to dispatch it (sevkiyat 
[dispatchment] was the official term for the “deportations”).  In June, thousands of people of the 
provincial capital, among them the 3750 Gregorian families, followed a handful of policemen.  A 
great number of them were massacred on their way inside the province; a few passed through 
Mardin.83  Simultaneously, the vali turned to the other towns and villages of his province.  Often, 
as in Djezire, this meant the nearly complete massacre of the Christian population, without the 
effort of organizing deportations.  Two kaymakams, Nesimi Bey of the district of Lice and Sabit 
Bey of the district of Beﬂiri, who opposed the policy of the vali, were ambushed and assassinated. 
                                                
82 This dispatch very probably concerns the murder of the notables deported on 30 May (cf. 
Ternon 2002, 89–80, 281–82), but seems to blend it together with simultaneous murders 
(therefore the mention of women and children). 10 June 1915, Walter Holstein, German Vice-
Consul in Mosul to the Embassy in Constantinople, PA-AA/BoKon/169 (Lepsius 1919, doc. 
78 and 80). 
83 The Dominican Pater Hyacinthe Simon in Mardin reported a group of 510 deportees passing 
through Mardin, but killed soon after at Dara on 13 July 1915 (Hyacinthe Simon, Mardine, la 
ville héroïque. Autel et tombeau de l'Arménie (Asie Mineure) durant les massacres de 1915, 
manuscript in the Bibliothèque du Saulchoir, Paris,  137–38, cited in Ternon 2002, 96. 
26 
 
 26 
Lice was the only place invaded some months later by the Russian army.  Armenian soldiers of 
its vanguard were said to have then committed acts of revenge against the Muslim population.84 
The German diplomatic service mentions vali Reﬂid several times already in June 1915, 
informing the embassy in Constantinople of the general massacres of Armenian men, women and 
children then in progress in the province of Diyarbakır.  In July, German diplomacy began 
attending to the matter of vali Reﬂid on a higher level.  On July 12, 1915, the ambassador in 
Constantinople, Wangenheim, gave the following note in French to the minister of the interior, 
Tâlât :  “The German Embassy has just learned the following from a reliable source: The vali of 
Diyarbakır, Reﬂid Bey, has recently organized regular massacres among the Christian population 
in his district, without distinguishing between Armenians and Christians belonging to other 
denominations, and without worrying about whether they were guilty or innocent.…  Under the 
orders of Reﬂid Bey, policemen from Diyarbakır went to Mardin and there arrested the Armenian 
bishop together with a large number of Armenians and other Christians, 700 people in total; all of 
them were driven to a place outside the city during the night and slaughtered like sheep.  The 
total number of the victims of these massacres is estimated at 2000 souls.  If the Imperial 
Government does not take measures against Reﬂid Bey, it must be feared that the lower classes of 
the Muslim population from the surrounding vilayets might themselves rise up to indulge in a 
general massacre of all Christian inhabitants.”85 
This intervention by the embassy seems to have been the consequence of a dispatch by 
Holstein of July 10, which had demanded the immediate removal of the vali of Diyarbakır.86  But 
Tâlât  simply passed over the German “meddling.”  It is true that on the same day (July 12), he 
conveyed the German note, partly word for word, to his subordinate comrade, and urged him not 
                                                
84 Rhétoré, 49, cited in Ternon 2002, 103. On Lice in 1915 see also Naayem, J., Les Assyro-
chaldéens et les Arméniens massacrés par les Turcs. Documents inédits recueilis par un 
témoin oculaire, Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1920. Naaman Efendi was director of the Dette Publique 
at Lice. 
85 PA-AA/BoKon/169 (Lepsius 1919, doc. 112); note of Johannes Mordtmann, Generalkonsul 
in Konstantinopel: “am 12/7 persönlich an Talaat bej übergeben.” Cf. also the dispatch already 
cited to the Reichskanzler on 31 July 1915. 
86 10 July 1915, Walter Holstein, deutscher Vizekonsul in Mossul an die Botschaft in 
Konstantinopel, DE/PA-AA/BoKon/169 (cf. Lepsius 1919, doc. 110). 
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to apply the anti-Armenian measures to the other Christians.  What unsettled the minister of the 
interior when confronted with the German reaction was the bad publicity and also the fact that 
Reﬂid was applying to the Assyrians the same “disciplinary measures [tedâbir-i inzibâtiye] 
intended for the Armenians,” as Tâlât  calls them in the encrypted telegram.  In this respect the 
boss harshly criticized his subordinate in a second telegram of July 20, 1915, urging him to stop 
the indiscriminate anti-Christian measures that were “very detrimental to the country.”87  It seems 
that Tâlât's telegram of July 12 resulted in an amnesty for the non-Armenian Christians.  But this 
did not last long and was, according to Rhétoré, an opportunity for the local rulers to extort more 
money from those hoping to be granted an amnesty.88 
The ally’s diplomats could not, or would not, understand that, basically, the vali of 
Diyarbakır had been acting by mutual agreement with his superior from the outset.  By the time 
of the illegal expulsion of the Rumlar during the first half of 1914, Tâlât had already successfully 
concealed a policy that he would not acknowledge in front of the foreign diplomats. On August 
14, 1915, Holstein unsuccessfully reiterated his demand for the removal of Reﬂid Bey and called 
“the atrocities officially committed in the province of Diyarbakır” historically unique.89 
The persecutions continued until the month of September.  A telegram from the embassy 
to the foreign ministry of September 10, 1915 confirmed the general fact of the central 
government’s two policies, one official, one concealed, as well as the direct implication of the 
regular army in the massacre of the Armenians.  In particular, the telegram highlighted two 
characteristics of the extermination in Diyarbakır under Governor Reﬂid:  In this case, it affected 
all Christians, not just the Armenians, and it included men, women and children.  Compared to 
other governors who usually had the men massacred on the spot, and the women and children 
                                                
87 BOA DH.ﬁFR, no. 54/406, 12 July 1915, transcribed in Ottoman Documents, 75. Cf. 
Akçam’s deliberations (1999, see fn. 61,  25–26). DH. ﬁFR no. 54-A /248, 20 July 1915. 
88 Rhéroré, 37, cited in Ternon 2002, 96, cf. 97. 
89 14 August 1915, Walter Holstein, German Vice-Consul in Mosul to the Embassy in 
Constantinople, PA-AA/BoKon/170 (Lepsius 1919, doc. 139). In an earlier dispatch, Holstein 
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deported to the camps in Syria, the vali of Diyarbakır carried out a program of maximal killing; 
unlike other provinces, he did not seem to distinguish between Syriac and Armenian Christians.90 
The weeding out of Christian communities went on until autumn.  On September 28, 
1915, the vali sent a telegram to the minister of the interior, stating that he had removed 120,000 
Armenians from his province.91  On October 19, 1915, a friend named Halil Edib, vice governor 
of the district of Mardin, sent Reﬂid Bey his congratulations for the kurban bayramı by telegraph 
from Mardin, saying, “I kiss your hands, you who have gained us the six [eastern] provinces and 
you have opened to us access to Turkestan and to the Caucasus.”92  He somewhat exaggerated the 
“salutary” Panturanist effects of the vali’s deeds.  This telegram nevertheless is a clue to the 
strong Panturanist views of this friend of the vali and the vali himself. 
Vali Dr Reﬂid was responsible, or at least co-responsible, of the murder of two 
kaymakams who opposed the anti-Armenian policy, even if, under the threat of the tribunal, he 
vividly defended himself in his Mülâhazât against the accusation of having organized the 
assassinations.93  His incredible version of the two murders and his conceited tone, moreover, cast 
a dark shadow onto the intellectual honesty of the author of this long text, the bulk of which 
concerns the Armenians.  In the minutes of the police interrogations, recently published, there is 
no evidence of a general Armenian plan of massacring the Muslims, as he contended.  That evil 
powers called Armenians wanted to annihilate the Ottoman nation was the idée fixe of his 
                                                
90 Ambassador Hohenlohe-Langenburg to the German Foreign Office, 11 September 1915, 
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92 Cited in Bilgi 1997, 29. For more on Halil Edib see Üngör 2006, 73. 
93 Reﬂid, Mülâhazât,  79–91. Abidin Nesimî Bey, son of Hüseyin Nesimî Bey (the liberal 
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radicalized mind.94  There are nevertheless some pertinent elements in his Mülâhazât:  He himself 
did not know the terrain; he had few trained security forces; there was great fear among the 
Muslims of losing their position as a ruling group; the situation in the province was chaotic; in 
short, an orderly evacuation of 120,000 Armenians was impossible from the outset. 
An incontestable point is the fact of Reﬂid's hatred against the Christians, particularly the 
Armenians, by the time he arrived at Diyarbakır.  Linked with this was an attitude that made clear 
to all his subordinates that the death of the group designated as traitors was legitimate and 
necessary for the sake of nation and religion.  It was not always necessary to give specific orders 
– his entourage knew what Dr Reﬂid and the CUP wanted.  It could anticipate what they would 
order and what they would welcome.  Such a picture corresponds with findings on how the Shoah 
really began in Eastern Europe in 1941-1942.  It shows the importance of local agencies whose 
murderous actions were only possible because they were in agreement with superiors in the 
center.  The ideological articulation had prepared the ground for deeds that, in a cumulative and 
systematical radicalization, but without full preliminary blueprint, took the form of a total 
genocide.95  From this point of view Dr Reﬂid was neither the servile instrument nor the enfant 
terrible of the central CUP-régime – he was rather its convinced and consistent executioner.  He 
was explicit and did not use the double language and apologetic lies made up in the capital for the 
Germans' and other foreigners' ears. 
Reşid Bey was eager to serve the fatherland in accordance with the will of the party.  He 
was well integrated into the CUP power structure during the years 1913–1916.  Despite his pride 
and his difficult character, he was respected, or at least seen as very useful by the Ittihadist 
center.  The latter was at the time dominated by his superior and party brother, Tâlât Bey, as well 
as by his colleagues from the School of Medicine, Nâzım and Bahaeddin Şakir.  His rapid 
promotion and his appointment to important posts confirm this view.  He was sent to particularly 
difficult places, beginning with the Aegean region in 1913, where at the end of the same year, a 
secret policy of expelling Christians was established for the first time.  Important offices in the 
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Eastern Provinces followed, where since the spring of 1915 a policy to remove the Armenians 
completely was applied.  In autumn 1916, this enormous goal had been more or less achieved. 
After the “success” of the anti-Armenian policy, the regime had gained a prime interest in 
cooling things down, so as not to compromise its future on the international scene.  At this point 
Dr Reﬂid became an inconvenience to those in power, partly because his misdeeds had not passed 
unnoticed by the foreign powers.  They had even led to vivid protests by the German ally.  The 
name of the vali of Diyarbakır had become a symbol for the premeditated murder of Christians. 
In addition, Reﬂid Bey, as vali of Ankara (between March 26, 1916 and March 27, 1917), turned 
against the system then in place, which was full of corruption and war profiteers.  His 
intransigence and straightforwardness began seriously to upset the regime.  Confronted by 
corruption among functionaries in the vilayet of Ankara, on the other hand, Dr Reﬂid could not 
remain inactive.  It is not clear whether stories telling of Dr Reﬂid’s enrichment while in office 
are true.96  His efforts to make a living through trade in 1917–1918 and his family’s poverty after 
1919 seem to suggest the contrary.97  But possibly after 1913 he became both licentious in his 
hate against Christians, and, as so many other officers, corrupt and greedy.  Unlike more 
Machiavellian figures such as Tâlât, or his two colleagues mentioned above, the patriot Reﬂid 
Bey probably believed at least partly in the view of the Armenians as “exploiters,” 
“bloodsuckers,” “tumors,” and “microbes.”  This dehumanized and pseudo-scientific vision of 
internal foes seems to have coexisted with the tenderness of the family father Reﬂid Bey, even if 
he was mostly absent, taken by his beloved service for the state (again an unsurprising finding if 
compared with perpetrators of the Jewish genocide in the Second World War).98 
It was Reﬂid Bey’s known and irrefutable implication in the murder of the Armenians that 
made this figure embarrassing to the CUP politicians, who, faced with defeat, wished to save 
their heads, and also, their national project in Anatolia. To wide political circles, it was thus 
tempting to point at certain Ittihadists, and to portray the vali of Diyarbakır as exceptional. 
Rightly, Süleyman Nazif asked in 1919, “Beyond Diyarbakır, there is a whole other group of men 
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like Reﬂid.  What will they do?”99  Mehmed Reﬂid was hardly wrong in feeling himself to be the 
scapegoat for an entire large group, when after his arrest, he wrote in his diary that he alone was 
held responsible.100  Others could have wanted his suicide, but there is no evidence. Once the 
Turkish national movement had won its battle and had established itself internationally, it was no 
longer so necessary to distance oneself from Reﬂid.  This crops up again, however, in the 
interview by a journalist from Resimli Tarih with Mithat ﬁükrü, during which, in an account of 
his conversation with Reﬂid Bey, the former portrays himself as being above all criminal 
suspicion.101 
By taking the impoverished family of Dr Reﬂid into its care after his suicide – even 
though in itself an irreproachable act by the Great National Assembly of Angora – the republic at 
the same time explicitly appropriated the political figure of Reﬂid Bey.  This second act bore 
grave consequences. Dr Reﬂid once again became the loyal and deserving servant of the state, 
according to the image he himself cultivated in his notes.  A few lines written by Mithat ﬁükrü 
Bleda on Reﬂid Bey in his memoirs are very significant in this regard.  Contrary to the interview 
in Resimli Tarih, the secretary general of Union and Progress from 1916–1918 speaks clearly 
here.  In no way does he question the behavior of the vali of Diyarbakır.  On the contrary, Mithat 
ﬁükrü portrays Dr Reﬂid as an infallible man of science who, rightly and for the supreme 
salvation of the Turkish nation, had been resolved to “annihilate the illness and the ill,” meaning 
the “minorities” and the Armenians here perceived as mentally ill – a kind of judgment that 
condemns its author and its author's ideology.  Social Darwinism, hygienic discourse, a cult of 
raison d’état, and political resentments blend together in his extraordinary vindication: 
Vali Dr Mehmed Reﬂid Bey was a doctor who, amid the most difficult of 
conditions, did not shy away from bearing the responsibility for the heavy duties 
he had been charged with.…  Regarding the question of how the fatherland 
[memleket] could be liberated from its pains, after he diagnosed the disease in 
question and took all responsibility onto himself, and, as doctor and statesman, 
showed the courage as well as the maturity to accomplish the task he had been 
accorded….  This was during the most critical period of Turkey’s political life, in 
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the years 1908–1918.  Vali Dr Mehmed Reﬂid Bey was then serving in the civilian 
administration.  He diagnosed the mental illness [ruhî hastalıklar] of the 
minorities.  For they supported England, Russia and France, who for centuries had 
desired to partition Turkey, and were finally also of help to the United States, in 
that they referred to the principles of President Wilson.  In conjunction with the 
diagnosis, Vali Dr Mehmed Reﬂid Bey also pointed out the last possible cure 
during the final period:  Either to destroy the illness and the ill, or to see the entire 
Turkish people and its country perish at the hands of maniacs [deliler].  Vali Dr 
Mehmed Reﬂid Bey was a scientist.  His outlook and his behavior could not be 
wrong, and were not.  Vali Dr Mehmed Reﬂid Bey’s behavior was sanctioned by 
the National Assembly of Turkey by according his children an annuity in return 
for his services to the fatherland, and also recognized by Atatürk.”102 
How can we explain Dr Reﬂid’s thoughts and actions?  An important underlying factor of 
vali Reﬂid’s final stance was the power- and state-oriented socialization at the Military Medical 
School, where young men, members of the Muslim ruling class (millet-i hakime) worried about 
their and their state's future, vexed by the specter of its end. Those seen guilty for this specter – 
first Sultan Abdül Hamid, then the Ottoman Christians, above all the Armenians – needed to be 
eliminated.  Power, politics and fatherland stood above ethics and History's judgment.  As far as 
our sources show Reﬂid became openly anti-Christian only as governor of Karesi in 1913–1914, 
when he was deeply involved in the expulsion of Greek-Orthodox compatriots.  At the beginning 
of the First World War, he took offices near the front where he saw defeat.  He became anxious, 
angry and arrogant.  When in March 1915 he arrived in Diyarbakır he was radicalized enough to 
do what he did between March and September.  The material presented in this chapter gives the 
impression that he arrived with the determination once and for all to get rid of the Christians in 
his province where a strong anti-Christian potential already existed.  Dr Reﬂid just needed 
specific orders from the center. 
He believed that the Ottoman nation would be annihilated by inner and exterior foes, that 
the Muslim “nation” with which he identified was in a deadly battle between Muslims and 
Christians, between Turkish power and the effrontery of the traditionally subordinate gavur – this 
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is the basic tenor of Mülâhazât, his apologetic text of the end of 1918.103  Reﬂid set the decline of 
its own nation against the genocide of others.  For its “salvation” he felt compelled to destroy an 
entire community. The “patriotic” mass murderer declared ill and incurable, and therefore a target 
of mass killing, this community of defenseless victims.  The fact that both Young Turkish 
generations, including the founders of the Republic of Turkey, counted Dr Reﬂid amongst its 
heroes, and not among its tragic and criminal figures, betrays a more general setting of the course 
of history.  This has cast dark shadows onto the historical conscience of several Turkish 
generations to follow.  One ought not simply to dismiss Dr Reﬂid as a demon, but to analyze and 
contextualize his personality, career and actions. At long last, facts should be faced as to what 
criminal point this “upright patriot,” and with him Union and Progress, the great organization of 
the Turkish national movement, had arrived at in 1915. 
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